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Abstract 
We focus on describing some of the effects of austerity capitalism in 
the public educational sector in Poland, a country that was a part of 
the Soviet bloc from WWII and experienced dramatic transformation 
after 1989.  This transformation from “communism” to “democracy” 
involved all spheres of the life of society and individuals and meant a 
dramatic re-orientation of the social, political and economic 
imaginary.  We see the current post-transformation moment in Poland 
as characterized by the dominance of three fundamental tendencies: 
predatory neoliberalism, creeping authoritarianism and nationalist 
neoconservatism. For the purposes of this text, we will begin with a 
short discussion of neoliberalism as it took over post-communist 
Central Europe during the last decade of the 20th century and 
onwards. We will focus especially on privatization as a key dimension 
of neoliberal transformation intertwined as it was with strong 
neoconservative tendencies, centering in our discussion on the effects 
of these trends on Polish public education.  
 
Keywords: Poland, public education, neoconservatism, neoliberalism, 
authoritarianism, nationalism  
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Introduction  
The writing of this text takes place in a difficult period in the modern history of 
Poland. A little over three years ago, on August 6, 2015 Andrzej Duda, the 
candidate of the right-wing nationalist party Law and Justice (Prawo i 
Sprawiedliwość) took over as the Polish President. His victory paved the way 
for the party’s triumph in the general elections in November 2015.  As a result, 
Law and Justice now rules Poland with an overall majority that allows them to 
enforce decisions without entering into negotiations and coalitions with other 
political allies or opponents. The new Polish Parliament is composed of 460 
MPs who all represent right of centre positions on the political spectrum with no 
left-wing representation. This is an unprecedented situation in the country in the 
period since 1989, one which has generated an entirely new way in which 
political decision-making processes proceed. Many of us watched with 
powerless astonishment night-time Parliamentary ‘debates’ which ended up 
passing resolutions that disempowered the Constitutional Court, curtailed the 
independence of the media and expanded surveillance rights of the state secret 
service, enforcing an authoritarian control of the state in key arenas of political 
life.  
 
On the international arena, government policy has been directed toward a 
confrontation with the European Union, resulting in the historically first 
activation of Article 7 of the EU Treaty, a procedure which can lead to the 
suspension of certain rights from a member state. Of particular concern to the 
EU are actions of the Polish state deemed illegal according to EU legislation, 
especially those in the judicial sphere (the political subordination of the 
prosecutor's office to the Minister of Justice and the devastation of the 
Constitutional Tribunal and the Supreme Court), and those related to 
environmental protection (concentration of the state's energy policy on fossil 
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fuels, limitation of focus on renewable energy sources and the destruction of the 
Białowieża Primeval Forest by wood mining).  
 
It is important to stress that the discourse of those in power is strongly grounded 
in nationalist and religious sentiments, relying on anti-immigrant / anti-refugee, 
anti-German, anti-European rhetoric and a populist claim to support the 
underprivileged. What we are seeing is a neoconservative backlash (Frank, 
2004; Hochschild, 2017) carried out in the name of a “positive change.” This 
change is for the benefit of “good Poles” who are presumed to be socially 
excluded, devoted Catholics and really Polish. These imagined good Poles are 
pitted against the other Poles of a “worse sort” whose views are pro-Europe, 
pro-pluralism, pro-gender equality and pro-ecology. The divisive governmental 
discourse and actions are reflected in the streets of Polish cities that have 
experienced a massive growth in public demonstrations. On the one hand, these 
have been led by nationalist movements, such as the National Rebirth of Poland, 
which organized highly visible and internationally commented events, including 
an anti-refugee demonstration that was concluded by the burning of an effigy of 
a Hasidic Jew bearing a European Union flag in the historic centre of Wroclaw 
(Haaretz, 2016; Harulkowicz, 2015, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c; Sokol, 2015). On the 
other hand, people have expressed mass support for various anti-government 
grassroots initiatives, including mass demonstrations organized by the 
Committee for the Defence of Democracy, the Citizens of the Republic of 
Poland or the All-Poland Women’s Strike. In addition to these mass 
demonstrations, Poland has seen other powerful opposition activities led by 
excluded social groups, including the long-term occupation of the Polish 
Parliament by people with disabilities and their families as well as the powerful 
general teachers’ strike, which paralyzed public schools during the 2019 spring 
exam period.  
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We want to argue that the current ultraconservative takeover of the Polish state 
and the ensuing sociopolitical predicament is not sudden and unexpected, but an 
outcome of the historic process of post-communist transformation, which has 
been characterized by three fundamental tendencies – predatory neoliberalism, 
nationalist neoconservatism and creeping authoritarianism. 
 
i) The first and foremost is predatory neoliberalism, which has generated deep 
discrepancies in wealth through immiseration. Karol Modzelewski, a prominent 
historian and one of the leaders of the pre-1989 anti-government movement, 
summarized the quandary:  
 
Poland was modernized through transformation, but its social costs turned out to 
be very high, and even more importantly - very permanent. The income 
discrepancy is one of the highest in Europe. These inequities are permanent, 
inherited from generation to generation. The inequities of income are reflected in 
the access to health care, education and chances of advancement for future 
generations. […] Equality of opportunity remains in the realm of dreams. Most of 
the children and grandchildren of those left behind by the ship of neoliberal 
modernization will never be able to get on board. (Modzelewski, 2013: 405-406) 
 
ii) The second, closely interrelated tendency has been the reliance of the post-
1989 political leaders on neoconservative ideologies tied strongly to the 
enforcement of the nationalist historical imaginary. Anthropologist Michal 
Buchowski refers to “three notable legacies: Patriotism/Nationalism, 
Catholicism, Consumerism à la Communism” (Buchowski, 2001: 79-81), which 
had shaped Polish opposition to the totalitarian system and made Poland “the 
most reluctant and rebellious member of the Soviet Bloc” (Buchowski, 2001: 
78). After 1989, strengthened by their most recent historic role, these legacies 
continued to persist in the post-1989 era to the detriment of cultural, economic 
and political pluralism.  
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iii) The exclusion of alternative visions has been one of the most persistent 
phenomena of the post-1989 sociopolitical and economic reality, and expressed 
itself in the growing culture of containment that came to dominate the public 
sphere (Cervinkova, 2014), paving the way to renewed authoritarianism. By 
containment, we refer to practices whose goal it is to exclude the conditions of 
possibility for public debate, which is key to participatory democracy. 
Containment - the silencing and repression of alternative voices - has been a key 
instrument in realizing the neoliberal and neoconservative vision for Poland as a 
newly democratic and capitalist country of national harmony. These 
containment practices have for long characterized Polish public discourse, 
contributing greatly to the drawing of the limits of Polish democracy. Today, it 
is clear that Poland has joined the growing group of countries, whose political 
system is defined by the rule of the majority brought to power through free 
elections, but not characterized by freedoms ensured by constitutional 
democracy. Polish sociologist Maciej Gdula sees this new form of 
authoritarianism as defined by the “undifferentiation of difference” (Gdula, 
2018) – the political tendency to create one-dimensional polity unified in the 
realm of culture, politics, religion and sexuality. This system paradoxically 
relies on democratic instruments to introduce and maintain undemocratic order:  
 
Today's authoritarianism is also distinguished from the former one by its attitude 
to democracy. In the past, authoritarianism directly targeted the democratic rule 
and was supposed to be an antidote to degenerated parliamentarianism. Today, it 
benefits from the democratic imaginary and seeks legitimacy through broad 
mobilization and elections (Gdula, 2017: 38).   
 
As we are writing this article, the parliamentary majority is continuing in its 
offensive against democratic institutions, solidifying authoritarian rule, which 
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builds on the conditions of possibility created by the neoliberal and 
neoconservative politics of post-communist transformation. 
 
Containment is also an important element of neoliberal and neoconservative 
education (Popen 2002), which suppresses critical thinking to maintain “the 
social universe of Capital” (Malot, Hill, Banfield, 2013: 13). Curry Malott, 
Dave Hill and Grant Banfield point to the repressive and controlling ways 
through which neoliberalism is enforced with the help of neoconservatism 
through pressures on education, educators and students (Malot, Hill, Banfield, 
2013: 6). Polish educational theorists and researchers described the deployment 
of these mechanisms in Poland (Kwieciński, 2012; Szkudlarek, 2005; 2010; 
Michałowska, 2013; Rudnicki, 2016; Potulicka and Rutkowiak, 2012).  An 
important feature of the process whereby neoliberalism and neoconservatism 
came to dominate social life and education in Poland, has been its TINA (There-
Is-No-Alternative) character and the inconspicuous way in which it has been 
accepted and promulgated. The critical media commentator Jacek Żakowski 
claims:  
 
In Polish politics [TINA] has become so omnipotent that even elementary 
political questions (“how much private and how much public,” “what kind of 
stratification,” “what role of the state,” “how to protect public interest in the 
economy,” “what kind of society are we trying to build”) have been effectively 
excluded from the debate. Where there is no alternative, there can be no 
discussion! (Żakowski, 2005: 9). 
 
The Mimetic Inevitability of Neoliberalism  
In an illuminating political economy of urban education, Pauline Lipman speaks 
of neoliberalism as a new social imaginary, a way that people have come to 
think of the way that the world is and should be organized. The power of 
neoliberalism, she says, “lies in its saturation of social practices and 
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consciousness, making it difficult to think otherwise” (Lipman, 2011: 6). 
Postcommunist transformation must thus be seen as the reordering of the social 
imaginary facilitated by a concrete set of policies and institutionalized changes. 
It is a process of change which Hana Cervinkova, in her ethnography of the 
changing imaginary of the Czech military officers during the post-socialist era, 
referred to as mimesis (Cervinkova, 2006, 2009). She argues that the 
reorientation of the Czech military following the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact 
and the expansion of NATO, involved a radical reorientation of the objective of 
the human and social capacity and urge to imitate, from the Soviet to the 
Western style military discipline and the related geographic location of the 
enemy from the West to the East. A similar lens, we argue, could be applied to 
transformation as a whole, which in the case of Central European satellites of 
the Soviet Union involved a 180-degree reorientation of the objective to be 
imitated from centrally planned socialist economy to neoliberalism.  
 
One way to illustrate the speed of this mimetic change is through the Polish 
‘career’ of the writings of Peter McLaren. When McLaren’s text Language, 
schooling, and subjectivity: Towards a critical pedagogy of experience (1988) 
first appeared in the Polish translation in 1991, most readers who were not 
familiar with the Western neoliberal experience read the text as a work of 
science fiction. The language and the categories McLaren used were very 
distant and foreign to the Polish imaginary, at the time still grounded in the 
socialist experience. McLaren’s text was saturated with Marxist terminology 
that for Polish readers was the language used (or rather misused) by the 
previous regime. It was also critical of a reality toward which people’s mimetic 
faculty was now reoriented and striving. The critical language and perspective 
that McLaren used to describe the world of Western neoliberal education was at 
first well-received only by a rather small group of Polish academics. Now, more 
than twenty years later, the situation is radically different. When Peter 
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McLaren’s book Life in Schools (1994) was published in Polish in 2015 at the 
occasion of the V International Conference of Critical Education in Wroclaw, it 
became an instant bestseller. Twenty years into the neoliberal transition, 
McLaren’s book was describing a world people in Poland have come to 
experience first-hand and which has now become painfully easy to ‘imagine’. 
 
Privatization, Marketization, Austerity 
A key category that embodies the process of neoliberal and neoconservative 
change in post-communist Poland is privatization. Between 1990-2011, 7551 
state businesses were privatized and by 2012 the Polish state was the owner of 
only 83 remaining enterprises (Central Statistical Office, 2012: 28). The 
swiftness of privatization was staggering - most of it was concluded in the 
1990s, when state businesses were still in poor shape and did not dispose of 
modern technologies, which impacted their sales value and the professional 
trajectories of workers. While privatization was presented as the sole rescue 
mechanism for Polish companies and Polish economy as a whole, from today’s 
point of view it is difficult to fully justify its speed, reach and the lack of 
accompanying regulatory mechanisms. Qualitative studies of privatization of 
Polish firms following their sale to foreign companies showed its detrimental 
effects, especially in the area of social and human relations, employee rights, 
gender equality, trade unions prerogatives and general social equity and justice 
(Dunn, 2004; Hardy, 2009) But privatization in the 1990s was not limited just to 
the sphere of economy. Instead, it is safe to say that privatization touched all 
areas of life and constituted the basis of people’s shared social experience in the 
first decade of the new regime. It deeply affected people’s imaginaries and 
identities. Polish intellectuals such as Karol Modzelewski who were once 
deeply involved in the anti-totalitarian struggle, reflected on the transformation 
of workers’ consciousness and the dissolution of working-class solidarity, 
observing with sadness how the proud Polish workers who built the Solidarity 
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Trade Unions that brought down the totalitarian rule, were transformed by the 
market economy into employees with fragmented loyalties and broken social 
ties (Modzelewski, 2013: 375-425).     
 
The transition to neoliberalism in the case of post-communist societies was 
especially drastic. This is because, unlike in capitalist societies where 
neoliberalism replaced older forms of capitalism, in the post-communist world 
the TINA neoliberalism was the immediate successor of state socialism under 
which property and property relations were under state’s control. What is 
probably most surprising is the unquestioned automatism with which the 
transition from state socialism to neoliberalism was implemented. Economic 
transition followed the logic of war - “the victor takes it all,” transforming 
Central European countries with long socialist history into neoliberalism’s 
global strongholds. The chief economists of the new national governments 
opened their post-socialist markets to free market economy through 
privatization coded in national laws and policies. These neoliberal transitions, 
however, were inspired by and overseen by transnational bodies, primarily the 
IMF.  These international institutions not only supported the privatization and 
marketization of economy, but they were also the primary guardians of austerity 
as a necessary accompanying measure. Poland, like other post-communist 
economies, was propelled from the socialist welfare state to the global 
neoliberal order. It is important to note that in Poland, the shock-therapy 
reforms were one of the most sweeping in the whole post-communist bloc and 
their radicalism produced social, economic and political results whose effects 
Poland still faces today (Klein, 2008: 97-125) In Poland, the shock doctrine was 
referred to as the Sachs-Balcerowicz plan, after the last names of its chief 
architects – the American / Polish team of economists – Jeffrey Sachs and 
Leszek Balcerowicz. But while Sachs has since come to criticize the predatory 
nature and radicalism with which Polish neoliberalism had been engineered 
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(Żakowski, 2009; Kołodko, 2007: 9), Balcerowicz has never expressed regret 
(Jabłoński and Stankiewicz, 2014). 
 
Privatization and the introduction of the market economy produced entirely new 
experiences for Poles. Chief among them was unemployment, a concept that has 
not (at least officially) existed in post-WWII Poland (hence the first annual 
measurement of the unemployment rate by the Main Statistical Office did not 
take place until 1990). The rise was astounding - from 6.5% (1.2 million) in 
1990 to 20% in 2002 (3.2 million). The incremental tendency was somewhat 
halted after Poland’s accession to the European Union and subsequent work-
related emigration, bringing unemployment down to 9.5% in 2008 and 9.8% in 
2015 (Główny Urząd Statystyczny, 2015: 18-19).   
 
In addition to emigration, the rates of unemployment have been lowered by the 
great rise in the number of university students. The emergence of higher 
education as a major area of the neoliberal market economy is tightly 
interwoven with European Union policies and associated promotion of the 
market value of higher education (Grollios, 2018). It is worth illustrating this 
exponential trend with concrete numbers. In 1989, the number of graduating 
university students in Poland was 50,000. In 1996 the number rose to 116,000, 
in 2004 to 304,000 and in December 2011 it was 498,000 (Główny Urząd 
Statystyczny, 2015: 45). The Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER) in higher education 
in Poland was 12% in the academic year 1990/91, 22% in 1995/96, 48% in 
2005/06, 52% in 2010/11 (Główny Urząd Statystyczny, 2015: 44).  Associated 
with the rise in student numbers has been the development of the private and 
semi-private higher education business. In 1989/90, there were 92 institutions of 
higher education registered in Poland (an overwhelming majority of them 
public). In 2010/2011 the number rose to 480, out which 330 were private 
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institutions educating 33.3% of students (Główny Urząd Statystyczny, 2014: 
30-33).  
 
Privatization, Marketization and Austerity in Poland’s Educational Sector  
Educational Reforms of 1991, 1999, 2016 
There were three major Polish education reforms after 1989 (1991, 1999, 2016), 
which reflected the larger political agendas of the country’s leadership. The first 
reform of 1991 was a part of the general decentralization trend and was set on 
removing education from the sole control of the state. During this time, we see a 
rise in the number of community schools as well as soft developments which 
included bottom-up curricular innovations, parent-school collaborations and 
efforts to introduce school-based democratic decision making (Rudnicki, 2016; 
Skura, 2013; Śliwerski, 2013).  
 
The second reform was introduced in 1999 by the conservative government and 
reflected the neoliberalization of the Polish economy, subordinating education 
to competition-driven efficiency indicators and neoconservative cultural 
programing. This reform introduced a new systemic structure of compulsory 
schooling (6 years of elementary education + 3 years of middle school + 3 years 
of high-school or vocational school) and a conservative curriculum resulting in 
the parametric increase in the quality of education (measured by PISA tests), 
and economic immiseration of schools through cost reductions (Białecki, 
Jakubowski and Wiśniewski, 2017; Chomczyńska-Rubacha, 2011; Herbst, 
Herczyński and Levitas, 2009; Suchecka, 2013; Zamojska, 2011). 
 
The latest reform of 2016 restored the pre-1999 educational system structure (8 
years of elementary school followed by 4 years of high school/vocational 
school) and introduced a new curriculum, which reflects the state’s 
neoconservative agenda (especially in the human and social sciences). The 
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effects of this reform on teachers, pupils and schools were drastic. Many 
teachers lost jobs due to the liquidation of the middle schools. The extension of 
elementary education resulted in infrastructural problems, with schools working 
in multiple shifts to accommodate increased number of classes and students. 
Most importantly, while the length of schooling remains the same (12 years), 
the abolishment of the 3-year middle school is likely to have a negative impact 
when it comes to the equality of access of students to further education. The 
role of the middle schools, which were obligatory after 6 years of elementary 
school, was to equalize educational chances for pupils from diverse 
socioeconomic backgrounds. After the newest reform, which lengthens the time 
of elementary schooling to 8 years followed by 4-year high-school reserved for 
those who score high on centralized exams is likely to stream 
socioeconomically disadvantaged pupils to vocational training. Moreover, the 
school reform, which was introduced without sufficient preparation and without 
any transition stage, furthered the precarity of teachers’ situations and careers 
and because of the speediness with which it was implemented, stretched the 
limits of the teachers’ and schools’ ability to manage the permanent state of 
emergency. (Sadura, 2017; Sikora, 2017; Suchecka, 2017).  
 
Austerity in Education  
Privatization and marketization have touched all levels of education in Poland, 
shrinking the role of the public sector, turning education into a key commodity 
of the neoliberal economy. It is important to stress that commodification of 
education concerns the Polish educational sector as a whole and is by no means 
limited to private institutions (Kwiek, 2014). The process of education’s 
neoliberalization was enabled by several interlinked dimensions/strategies. The 
first one concerns the change in the structure of financing, whereby budgetary 
responsibility for pre-primary, primary and secondary education was transferred 
from the state level to the local governments (beginning of the 1990s). 
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Currently, local governments receive annual subventions for education from the 
central government, but this money is not sufficient to finance the cost of public 
education. Wealthier towns and cities frequently co-finance public education 
from their own funds, while in other cases (especially in poorer regions) central 
subsidy is often misallocated by the local administration to compensate for 
shortages in other areas (e.g. infrastructural investments). This, of course, 
generates further discrepancies in wealth and educational levels between 
regions, individual schools, and pupils.  
 
Linked with this limiting of financial resources is the restructuring of schools by 
local governments, which act under increasing financial pressures. These are 
especially hard on small rural administrations with limited income (from taxes, 
projects and subventions) even though even large and relatively wealthy 
agglomerations have adopted emergency mechanisms due to the neoliberal 
budget optimalization strategies. These measures take on the form of liquidation, 
consolidation or hidden privatization of public education. Supported by new 
legislation, such as the law of 2009, local governments can close down schools 
which have fewer than 70 pupils (Dziemianowicz-Bąk and Dzierzgowski, 2014: 
14-30). The way this usually happens is that, at the beginning of the school year, 
the local community receives information from the mayor that their school will 
be closed (liquidation) and pupils can choose to be transferred to a larger 
regional school (consolidation). Alternatively, parents and teachers can decide 
to create a non-governmental organization, which can open a school in the same 
building, with the same pupils and many of the same teachers. These newly 
established schools are officially called non-public schools to avoid the word 
“private,” hence we speak of “hidden privatization” (Obidniak, 2014). Teachers 
work under different contracts than in the public sector, without employee rights 
and protections, generally earning 25% less money, working on average 30% 
more hours than in the public sector, with contracts often limited to 10 months a 
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year from September to June (Rzekanowski, 2013). Between 1995/6 and 
2011/12 school years, the number of primary and elementary schools run by 
NGOs tripled (from 187 institutions to 681 and from 18845 pupils to 38657). 
Most of these new schools are very small, with an average count of 55 pupils 
studying in classes 1 - 6. The number of such non-public secondary schools has 
risen from 219 (7132 pupils) in 2000/01 to 397 (24,514 pupils) in 2011/12 
(Rzekanowski, 2013: 195-196).  
 
It is important to note that many of the school closures occur in small rural 
communities where the local school functioned as one of the few centres of 
local cultural life (Dziemianowicz-Bąk, Dzierzgowski, 2014: 31-50). 
Consequently, school closures have wider negative social impact.  There are 
now communities in Poland where there are no public schools left and under 
austerity measures the local governments channel subventions to non-public 
(private) schools.  
 
The neoliberalization of Polish schools through austerity measures touches all 
aspects of the schools’ functioning and includes the privatization of school 
canteens, security, cleaning services, extra-curricular activities for children, 
class materials and utensils, school trips. The financial burden of austerity 
measures is increasingly transferred onto parents, deepening social inequalities 
and access to education. Inequalities are furthered strengthened by another 
important aspect of neoliberalization of Polish education - the introduction of 
mechanisms of accountability of pupils, teachers and schools through high 
stakes testing. First implemented in 2002, tests are now the norm in Polish 
schools on all levels, contributing to the culture of rivalry and the destruction of 
social solidarities. High stakes testing produced competition between individual 
schools and has been linked to deepening institutional differences and school 
closures (Lipman, 2004). 
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Apart from parents and pupils, it is, of course, teachers who carry the weight of 
the austerity measures and immiseration. According to 2015 OECD report, the 
salaries of Polish teachers are among the lowest in the European Union with the 
starting salary of 15,000 USD and the maximum on the scale of 26,000 USD 
per year (OECD, 2015, pp. 440-444). The conditions of teachers’ work and 
advancement have been under permanent political attack - especially the 
guarantees of permanent employment, required levels of qualifications, 
workload, and social security. Teachers have combatted these attacks primarily 
through trade unions, which belong to the most active trade unions in Poland 
(Smak and Walczak, 2015). Most notably, building on the historical legacy 
whereby Polish teachers were one of the groups most strongly represented in the 
Polish trade unions - Solidarność - that eventually led to the negotiations of the 
Round Table and the first semi-free elections in June 1989, the Polish teachers 
organized an all-nation general teachers’ strike in April 9, 2019.   
 
Neoconservatism in Education  
As Malott, Hill and Banfield argue, “neoliberalism is accompanied, enforced, 
by neoconservatism in its repressive and controlling forms. This control is 
asserted increasingly strongly over education, educators and students.” (Malott, 
Hill and Banfield, 2013: 6).  Education in post-communist Poland has been 
equally transformed by neoliberal and neoconservative ideologies, both of 
which took education by storm, marginalizing alternative visions and 
perspectives. The neoconservative change has been enabled by the 
implementation of conservative national ideologies through the curriculum and 
the subordination of the educational sector to the Catholic Church. 
 
Legitimized by its historical role in bringing down the one-party Communist 
rule in Poland, the Catholic Church has been a key player in the post-1989 
Polish politics. After 1993, when Poland signed the Concordat with the Vatican, 
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religion became an official school subject at all levels of primary and secondary 
education (grade 1 through 12). The introduction of religion in schools opened 
them to the direct influence of the Catholic Church which is in charge of 
religion as the subject, operating beyond the jurisdiction of the school Principal 
and public educational authorities. While, nominally, religion is not obligatory 
and parents should have a choice between classes in religion and ethics, the 
reality is different. Most schools did not offer ethics until 2014 (Biuro 
Rzecznika Praw Obywatelskich, 2015: 34-48) when it became somewhat 
obligatory to have at least a limited number of ethics classes. Social pressures 
have led an overwhelming number of parents to enrol their children in religion 
classes (Dziwisz, 2012), taught by priests, nun and teachers appointed by the 
Church. The presence of the Catholic Church in schools has been a source of 
symbolic violence (crosses decorating classrooms, the presence of Church 
officials at school ceremonies, ostracism against children who do not attend 
religion, lack of alternative spaces/classes for those who do not attend), creating 
a hostile environment to difference (Stańczyk, 2011).  
 
Church influence imbues Polish neoconservative curriculum in deep and hidden 
ways. The areas which have raised most attention among critical scholars are 
stereotypical visions of gender and family roles, and of ethnic and religious 
minorities. An important interrelated focus in critical educational scholarship 
has been on the nationalist historical curriculum, which enforces gender and 
ethnic stereotypes and militarism (Chmura-Rutkowska, Głowacka-Sobiech, 
Skórzyńska, 2015; Chomczyńska-Rubacha, 2011). For many years, feminist 
scholars have also criticized the lack of modern sex education in Polish schools 
and stereotypical visions of family life promoted under the school subject Life 
in the Family (Izdebski, Żak 2014: 4-11). The effects of neoconservatism in 
education are staggering: beyond the results of scholarly analysis of curricula 
and textbooks which reflect the neoconservative political agenda, we are 
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observing a rise in extreme nationalist attitudes among youth who participate in 
hate movements that openly promote anti-immigrant, anti-Semitic, anti-left, 
anti-gay, anti-Other politics. Hate speech and xenophobic and racist violence 
entered Polish public spaces, gaining coverage in both official and social media. 
Ethnographic research shows how teachers and youth struggle to navigate this 
deepening nationalism permeating both curriculum and public sphere (Rubin 
and Cervinkova, 2020). It is also important to note that official curricula as well 
as extracurricular activities set on promoting open attitudes and visions of the 
world introduced before 2016 are being eliminated from the spaces of Polish 
schools (Gawlicz, Rudnicki, Starnawski, 2015; Cervinkova, 2016).  
 
Conclusion 
In this text, we have described how immiseration capitalism has impacted the 
Polish educational sector. We have tried to show the current situation as an 
outcome of the historic process of post-communist transformation characterized 
by predatory neoliberalism, nationalist and religious neoconservatism and 
authoritarianism, which has been creeping into Polish public life through 
mechanisms of containment. As an outcome of this historical process, Polish 
education finds itself in a quandary. Pressured by austerity and accountability 
measures and smothered by neoconservative ideologies, the spaces for nurturing 
critical thought and the value of social solidarity and civic courage are 
constrained to a critical point. But this critical point is also a moment of hope. 
As we are sending this article to publication on April 21, Polish teachers are in 
the 13th day of a national strike. The teachers’ strike is taking place during the 
exam period in an overwhelming number of public schools on all education 
levels in Poland (from kindergartens to high-schools), providing a powerful 
example of resistance to the injustices of educational austerity through 
collective organizing.  
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